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Governments around the world have begun using markets as means to pol-
icy ends. Pollution control has been assigned to a market in emissions al-
lowances. The right to use the electromagnetic spectrum for telecommuni-
cations has been auctioned oﬀ. In electricity supply, markets have replaced
allocation by state agencies or regulated monopolies. In ﬁshery manage-
ment, tradable quotas have started to be used instead of direct regulation.1
Using markets to allocate public resources represents a middle ground
between privatization and government control. It is not privatization be-
cause the government retains substantial control rights. It is not govern-
ment control of the traditional kind because part of the decision-making
over how the resources are employed takes place in markets rather than in
the bureaucracy.
Controversy has dogged the adoption of markets by governments. Emis-
sions trading is immoral, say some environmentalists, for it legitimates
polluting. Critics of the spectrum auctions, like the technology guru Nicho-
las Negroponte (quoted in Financial Times, 8 June 2000, p. 5), say they
amount to “an economically unsustainable tax” on the telecommunica-
tions industry, bringing high prices for consumers and stiﬂing innovation.
The high electricity prices in California following deregulation prompted
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1. Another such use of markets is in restructuring publicly owned railroads (see chap. 11 in
this volume). Yet another is the proposal by the U.S. Shadow Financial Regulatory Commit-
tee (2000) that bank regulators create a new high-risk bond, the price of which would provide
input into the regulators’ decisions.calls to reregulate the industry. With the advent of tradable ﬁshery quotas,
says Greenpeace, “corporate interests are about to gobble up the rights to
species of ﬁsh and turn them into private property. With privatization we
lose our rights to have a say about how the oceans—something we all
share—are being treated” (www.greenpeaceusa.org/features/itq.htm).
The case for using markets is a pragmatic one: They are justiﬁed only if
they work better than the feasible alternatives. Do they? In what follows I
ask what can be learned from these experiences in the use of markets as pol-
icy tools.
Governments can successfully use markets. Information is the key (as
is elaborated in my recent book, McMillan 2002). The market process—
where it works well—generates information on which of the ﬁrms are able
to put scarce resources to the best use and on what the highest value use is.
This information is unlikely to be revealed via a political or administrative
procedure. Well-functioning markets remove the need, in other words, for
the government to pick winners.
The public sector’s ability to use markets, however, is constrained. The
very reasons that certain activities have historically been placed in the pub-
lic sector—natural monopoly, externalities, common property—make im-
plementing markets for them diﬃcult. “Leave it to the market” is usually
bad advice.
There are two senses in which markets are a limited tool (as is also ex-
plained in McMillan 2002). First, a market does not automatically work as
it is supposed to. The design of the market matters. With an ordinary
private-sector market, the rules and procedures that govern it have evolved
over years of trial and error. A public-sector market, by contrast, is judged
by how well it works from its inception. Its rules and procedures, therefore,
must be exhaustively thought through in advance. For a market to deliver
on its public-policy promise, the government must design it skillfully.
Second, a market can provide only part of the solution to a public prob-
lem. With spectrum rights, pollution rights, electricity, and ﬁsheries, the
market does its job only within a framework of continued government ac-
tion. Where there are elements of common property, externality, or natural
monopoly, regulation continues to be needed even after a market has been
introduced. The role of the market is to help the regulators do their job
more eﬀectively.
3.1 Spectrum Licenses
Auctions have been used by numerous governments to allocate licenses
to use the electromagnetic spectrum for telecommunications, starting in
New Zealand in 1990 and then the United States in 1994 and followed by
countries such as Australia, Mexico, Canada, the United Kingdom, Ger-
many, Hong Kong, and Singapore. The Financial Times (2 November
2000) called the spectrum auctions “the world’s largest concerted transfer
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auctions had fetched a total of $42 billion. In 2000, an auction of spectrum
licenses in the United Kingdom yielded $34 billion, and one in Germany
went to $46 billion.2
Before auctioning, spectrum licenses had been given away for free. Who
received the right to use the spectrum was decided by administrative hear-
ings, or, in the case of some U.S. cellular telephone licenses, by lottery.
Spectrum auctions, it is sometimes claimed, have the drawback of raising
the prices that consumers ultimately pay for services. Janice Hughes, of
Spectrum Strategy Consultants, said of Hong Kong, “An auction would
push the price of a single license to at least US$1 billion per operator and,
there is no question about it, those costs would be passed on to consumers
in the form of substantially higher prices” (South China Morning Post, 21
August 2000, p. 3).
To argue this, however, is to confuse ﬁxed and variable costs. A ﬁrm that
cares about its proﬁts bases its price on its marginal cost: that is, the cost of
supplying an additional customer with the service. The auction price is
paid before any service is provided—it is a ﬁxed cost—so it is not part of
the marginal cost of supplying the service and does not aﬀect the price
charged to customers. There is a caveat to this ﬁxed-cost argument. If cap-
ital-market frictions mean that the more the ﬁrm borrows, the higher the
interest rate it must pay, then the extra debt added by the auction price
could result in the ﬁrm’s investing less and having a higher marginal cost.
This caveat aside, the auction revenue is a pure transfer from the ﬁrm’s
proﬁts to the government. The price to users would be almost the same
whether the government sold the spectrum or gave it away.
Yet another complaint is that auctions favor large bidders with deep
pockets, so new entrants ﬁnd it hard to compete. Against this view is the
fact that the 1990s, the period in which market forces came into the tele-
communications industry, in fact saw far more entries than before. The
alternative to auctions, administrative processes, are not notably open to
outsiders. It may be easier for a new ﬁrm to raise money to bid in an auc-
tion than to become a player in the political process. Governments that use
so-called beauty contests to assign spectrum often favor the incumbents.
When South Korea awarded two mobile licenses by an administrative pro-
cedure in 2000, for example, it selected from several applicants the two that
were already the most entrenched: SK Telecom, Korea’s biggest mobile
provider, and Korea Telecom, which is state run. Auctions are more trans-
parent than most administrative procedures. (This is another aspect of the
information-provision feature of auctions: they enable the public to see
how the decision is made.) This transparency puts a brake on government
favoritism.
Mexico provides evidence against the doomsayers. The auctioning of
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2. On the European experience with spectrum auctions, see Klemperer (2002).spectrum licenses, from 1996 on, began a transformation of the telecom-
munications industry. Telephones for the ﬁrst time became accessible to
those other than the rich. By 2001, there were more subscribers to wireless
phone lines than ﬁxed-wire lines (16 million and rising vs. 12 million; San
Diego Mercury News, 19 July 2000, p. 1C). The wireless services were sup-
plied competitively by a half-dozen ﬁrms, while the ﬁxed-wire services were
provided by the incumbent monopolist, Telefonos de Mexico SA. As a re-
sult of the competition, consumers paid far less for wireless services than
for ﬁxed-wire services. The sums the wireless ﬁrms paid for their licenses—
totaling over $1 billion—were no impediment to entry and did not keep the
price of consumer services high.
3.2 Electricity
California’s electricity deregulation was supposed to create “a market
structure that provides competitive, low cost, and reliable electric service”
(Los Angeles Times,11 January 2001), according to the State Assembly bill
that initiated it. But it didn’t. The price of wholesale electricity rose to ten
times what it had been. Governor Gray Davis labeled the move to markets
“a colossal and dangerous failure” (Los Angeles Times, 14 January 2001).
Elementary supply and demand were at the heart of the crisis. Electric-
ity supply was inadequate. Economic growth had brought increases in Cal-
ifornia’s electricity usage, but few new generating plants had been built.
Exacerbating the supply problem, at the time of deregulation unusually
low rainfall and snowfall meant low water levels for hydro-generation and
increased the need to use natural gas to generate electricity. At the same
time there was a big increase in the price of natural gas.
In the old system, utilities operated as regulated monopolies: they could
pass any cost increases on to their customers in higher rates and so had
little incentive to hold their costs down. Deregulation meant wholesale
electricity prices were set by competition rather than by a regulator. But the
deregulation did not extend to retail prices, which continued to be held
ﬁxed, which meant that, when wholesale prices rose above retail prices, the
utilities made losses. It also meant that demand-side pressures were lack-
ing. Consumers had no price-based incentive to cut back at times when
supply was short.
“We are so far into the realm of extraordinary gouging we are orders of
magnitude oﬀ the chart,” California Assembly Speaker Fred Keeley told
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in 2001 (San Jose
Mercury News, 11 April 2001, p. 1A). Why did deregulation raise prices,
rather than lowering them as it was intended to?
The special features of electricity make the performance of the market
unusually sensitive to its design (Wilson 2002). Since electricity is costly to
store, it must be produced as needed. Demand ﬂuctuates. At peak demand
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pacity, and at such times those marginal producers can bid the price high.
The high prices were in part an ordinary market response to high de-
mand, when it is the high-cost gas-ﬁred plants, and not the low-cost hydro
plants, that are the marginal suppliers. When demand hits a peak, there-
fore, marginal cost is high. Moreover, the price of natural gas rose dramat-
ically in 2000. The price of electricity was driven up by the cost of genera-
tion.
At times, however, prices rose far above the generation costs. “There is
evidence that some generators may be withholding electricity,” Governor
Davis said, “to create artiﬁcial scarcity and drive up the price astronomi-
cally” (San Jose Mercury News, 11 April 2001, p. 1A). Such manipulation
of the market would have been illegal. It may not have been unnecessary
for the generators to illicitly collude, however. At peak demand, most gen-
erators cannot expand their output because they are already producing at
their full capacity. For the few remaining generators, the bidding incentives
can drive prices high even without coordinated bidding.
One company, Enron, used complex schemes with names like Fat Boy,
Ricochet, and Death Star to manipulate prices by tens of millions of dol-
lars. The state of California estimated the power suppliers overcharged it
to the extent of $9 billion during the crisis. The FERC agreed that over-
charging had occurred, but disagreed about the amount: FERC ruled that
the overcharging totaled $1.8 billion (New York Times, 23 March 2001,
p. A14; Financial Times, 13 December 2002, p. 8).3
3.3 Pollution Control
The U.S. government in 1990 introduced a new technique to reduce sul-
fur dioxide emissions, the main cause of acid rain. Replacing command
and control, under which each polluting ﬁrm had been directly regulated
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the act created a market
in the rights to pollute. It deﬁned emissions allowances, that is, licenses
allowing the holder to emit one ton of sulfur dioxide in one year. The
allowances were tradable: they could be bought, sold, or banked for future
use.
To reduce its emissions of sulfur dioxide, a coal-burning electricity pro-
ducer either installs scrubbers or switches to cleaner fuel. The costs of
cleanup diﬀer among plants, depending on location and the age and type
of their equipment. Implementing command and control eﬀectively would
have required considerable knowledge on the part of the EPA of each indi-
vidual plant.
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3. For estimates of the gap between price and marginal cost, see Borenstein, Bushnell, and
Wolak (2000) and Joskow and Kahn (2002).Tradable emissions allowances, by contrast, achieve pollution control
ﬂexibly. The total nationwide level of emissions is set by the government,
which prints a total number of licenses equal to the target level of emis-
sions. How much each plant cuts back is then set by the market. Those
ﬁrms that ﬁnd it relatively inexpensive to reduce their emissions sell some
of their allowances and use the revenue to pay for their abatement activi-
ties (and have some proﬁt left over). Those that ﬁnd abatement relatively
costly buy extra allowances. As a result, the target reduction in total emis-
sions is achieved at the lowest possible cost to the industry.
The emissions-allowances program has been a success, according to var-
ious studies. The Environmental Defense Fund, an environmental group,
said in its March 1995 newsletter that emissions trading “is cleaning up
acid rain faster and far more cheaply than skeptics had predicted. The mar-
ket system is unleashing inventiveness and showing that the cleanup need
not put a heavy burden on the economy” (www.edf.org). The pollutants
emitted fell below the ceiling the government had set. This was achieved at
a cost to industry of billions of dollars less than the estimated cost of com-
mand and control. Air quality measurably improved.4
3.4 Fisheries
Fisheries are chronically overexploited. “The global marine ﬁsh catch is
approaching its upper limit,” according to an article in Science magazine
(Botsford, Castilla, and Peterson 1997, 509). “Almost a half of the individ-
ual ﬁsh stocks are fully exploited, and another 22 percent are overexploited.”
The management of marine ecosystems “has failed to achieve a principal
goal, sustainability.”5
The overﬁshing results from the open-access nature of the ﬁshery. In the
absence of rules, the individual ﬁshers have no incentive to conserve, be-
cause any ﬁsh they leave are taken by someone else. They cannot individu-
ally ensure the ﬁsh stocks are maintained.
Informal solutions to the open access problem work in certain circum-
stances. There are numerous examples of communities that have devised
collective mechanisms to counter overﬁshing (Sethi and Somanathan
1996). Informal solutions, however, work only within tight-knit ﬁshing
communities. With large, anonymous groups of ﬁshers that outsiders can
enter, social sanctions hold little sway and so some kind of government in-
tervention may be needed to prevent overﬁshing.
To regulate ﬁsheries, governments have imposed controls, each of which
has led to distortions. Regulatory controls on the number of boats have
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4. For more on evaluating the program, see Ellerman et al. (2000), Bohi and Burtraw (1997),
and EPA (1999). See also the EPA Web site, www.epa.gov/acidrain. For other environmental
programs that use market incentives, see Daily and Ellison (2002) and Goldberg (2001).
5. For an excellent account of the ﬁsheries crisis, see Grafton, Squires, and Kirkley (1996).brought bigger boats with extra equipment and crew. Restrictions on the
length of the vessels have induced companies to build wider, heavier boats.
Restrictions on the number of crew have resulted in investment in high-
tech ﬁshing gear (adding electronic devices for locating ﬁsh increase a
vessel’s catch dramatically). Restrictions on equipment have meant the hir-
ing of extra crew. Regulations specifying that ﬁshing can take place only
within a certain season induce ﬁrms to invest in high-capacity boats, so
they can catch as much as possible in the time allowed; the investments sit
idle for the rest of the year (Grafton, Squires, and Kirkley 1996; Grafton,
Squires, and Fox 2000). And even with these regulations, the overﬁshing
has continued.
Some governments have switched to a new, more market-based method
of ﬁsh conservation. The regulators assign to each ﬁshing vessel a quota,
deﬁning how much it is allowed to catch. Quotas directly address the basic
issue—that overﬁshing is a consequence of the fact that no one owns the
ﬁsh—by establishing property rights.
The New Zealand government introduced tradable quotas in the mid-
1980s. The aim was to reduce catches to sustainable levels. Quotas were al-
located to individual ﬁshers based on their prior investments in equipment.
The quotas may be bought and sold. A new entrant or an incumbent want-
ing to expand needs to buy quotas. This means the quotas tend to end up
with the most eﬃcient producers.
When the New Zealand government wanted to reduce the total catch be-
cause of what it judged to be overﬁshing, it used a market process. It called
for tenders from the ﬁshers. A bid stated how much money the ﬁsher would
accept to reduce the allowed catch by a speciﬁed amount. The government
accepted the lowest bids up to its target catch reduction, and paid each suc-
cessful bidder the market-clearing price per ton of quota reduction (Sharp
1996, 442).
The tradable-quota system is an application of the idea of Ronald Coase
(1960) of deﬁning property rights so as to solve an externality. The system
works eﬀectively (Grafton, Squires, and Fox 2000; Straker, Kerr, and
Hendy 2002). Fish stocks been conserved and ﬁshers’ proﬁts have risen.
Quota-holders have a stake in preserving the ﬁshery in order to maintain
the value of their quotas. In New Zealand, the ﬁshers have formed associ-
ations to fund research aimed at conserving the stocks of scallops, snapper,
and orange roughy. The creation of property rights has resulted, as Coase
said it would, in the open-access externality’s being internalized.
3.5 Lessons on Markets as Policy Tools
Some lessons can be drawn from these experiences in the use of markets
by governments. Markets can be useful policy tools, primarily because they
reveal information that otherwise might be unobtainable. But there are two
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solve only certain kinds of problems, and they need to be implemented well.
3.5.1 Markets Reveal Information
The emissions-allowance market, like any other competitive market,
generates information.6 It reveals how to allocate pollution reduction
across ﬁrms in the way that brings the lowest total cost. It also reveals what
the costs of reducing pollution actually are. Bureaucrats could, in prin-
ciple, control pollution as cost eﬀectively as the market by requiring extra
reduction from those plants that have lower abatement costs. Realistically,
however, they do not know where abatement costs are high and where they
are low. It is the ﬁrms themselves that best understand how much it would
cost them to cut their own pollution.
The EPA can know a ﬁrm’s abatement costs only if the ﬁrm itself volun-
teers the information. The incentives under command and control worked
against this. Managers, negotiating with the EPA, might exaggerate their
ﬁrms’ abatement costs in order to be assigned easier cleanup targets. The
managers may even not have known how low their abatement costs could
be driven, for under command and control they had little incentive to ﬁnd
out. Bureaucracy-run pollution controls are hindered by a lack of infor-
mation.7 Under the market, by contrast, ﬁrms with low cleanup costs have
a proﬁt-based incentive to reveal this fact, by selling their allowances.
Before emissions trading began, the EPA estimated it would cost $750 to
clean up a ton of sulfur dioxide. The electric-power ﬁrms claimed it would
cost them up to $1,500. The average price at which the allowances actually
traded over 1994–1999 was about $150.8 By selling an allowance for $150,
a ﬁrm was in eﬀect saying that cutting its emissions would cost it no more
than $150 per ton. In other words, the market revealed cost of cleanup to
be ﬁve to ten times less than had been previously suggested.
The spectrum auctions, similarly, revealed information. The multibil-
lion-dollar prices reached seemed too high to some observers at the time,
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6. For an overview of markets as information providers, see McMillan (2002).
7. It is theoretically possible to devise a centralized mechanism that induces ﬁrms to reveal
their private information, along the lines of Baron and Myerson (1982). This would involve
subsidizing the plants that reveal themselves to be low cost (and so are asked to do the most
cleanup) and taxing the others. Such a mechanism is, however, diﬃcult if not impossible to
implement in practice.
8. The $1,500 ﬁgure was stated in the 1990 Clean Air Act as the price of direct sales of al-
lowances by the EPA, and the $750 ﬁgure was cited by the EPA in 1990 as its best guess of the
price at which allowances would trade (Bohi and Burtraw 1997, 8). The allowances prices
ranged between $70 and $220 over 1994–1999 (see www.epa.gov/acidrain/ats/prices). The
price of low-sulfur coal fell in a way that could not have been anticipated, and this explains
part of the ﬁve- to tenfold diﬀerence between actual and predicted prices (Bohi and Burtraw;
Ellerman et al. 2000). Much of it, though, is due to information generation. (Although pric-
ing rules of the EPA auction tend to induce low prices, as I will discuss, this is not the expla-
nation, for most of the transactions occur in the private market.)and even more so with the beneﬁt of hindsight. In the frenzy of the bidding,
the critics say, the telecommunications executives bid far above their esti-
mates of value. If that were true, we should question their competence (as
should their shareholders). But it isn’t likely to be the correct interpreta-
tion. The auction prices revealed the industry’s best current estimate of the
value of the spectrum. Before there was competition, that knowledge
stayed with the ﬁrms. The arrival of competition forced the insiders to re-
veal the value of the spectrum rights, and to pass much of that value on to
the government.
The competitive process reveals information. After an auction, the seller
knows which of the bidders values the item the most, and the price gives an
estimate of value. There is a twist, however. The bidders are in part all try-
ing to estimate the same thing, the future proﬁtability of running mobile
telecommunications services. This common-value feature means the bid-
ders risk falling into the trap of the “winner’s curse”: that is, learning, too
late, that the price has gone higher than the item is worth. If they are all
knowledgable, then the best estimate is something like the average of their
valuations. The winning bid, of course, is higher than the average bid. The
winner is likely to be the bidder whose estimate is the most optimistic,
probably overoptimistic.
In any auction, unwary bidders risk overestimating the value of winning.
Bidders sometimes get caught up in the excitement of an auction and pay
too much. But they need not be fooled. Experienced bidders avoid the win-
ner’s curse by bidding cautiously: They recognize they will win only if they
have relatively high value estimates and bid accordingly lower. Alert win-
ners need not be cursed.9 It is not especially diﬃcult to avoid being subject
to the winner’s curse. All you have to do is understand precisely why there
is a risk of bidding too high. The phrase “winner’s curse” has in fact be-
come common parlance in the telecommunications industry, suggesting
the bidders did understand it.
The wisdom of hindsight is a diﬀerent matter. Changes in the telecom-
munications industry subsequent to the auctions in some cases, such as the
German and U.K. auctions, caused a rethinking of the value of the spec-
trum; but that is an ordinary business risk. In the optimistic late 1990s, the
industry set a high value on spectrum, anticipating vast proﬁts in the near
future from mobile telecommunications. In the pessimistic years of 2000–
2003, those proﬁts failed to materialize, and the bid prices were seen to
have overvalued the spectrum. But that is an ordinary business misjudg-
ment, not something inherent in the auction process. Ironically, the tele-
communications industry, long the recipient of government handouts, gave
something back via the spectrum auctions to taxpayers.
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9. On bidding to avoid the winner’s curse, see Wilson (1969) and Milgrom and Weber
(1982). On experiments with common-value auctions, see Garvin and Kagel (1994).In California’s electricity deregulation, the market’s information revela-
tion was thwarted. Because wholesale prices sometimes far exceeded mar-
ginal production costs, they provided no useful information about the
supply side of the market. And because retail prices were ﬁxed, they were
prevented from providing information about the demand side.
3.5.2 Markets Must Be Well Designed
The California electricity market tripped up on an elementary feature
of market design. Prices were not allowed to do their job. Although the
wholesale price at which the utilities bought power was market-set, the reg-
ulators ﬁxed the retail price the utilities charged their customers. If the re-
tail price had varied month by month to reﬂect wholesale prices, not only
could the utility have avoided indebtedness, but consumers would have
been motivated to conserve electricity. For business customers sophisti-
cated meters allowing real-time pricing could have been installed. Busi-
nesses could shut down when prices were high, and run extra shifts when
they were low. Peak-time power would thus be saved for other uses such as
in homes. With the retail price ﬁxed, the system had no way of responding
to shortages.
Some critics say California’s deregulation did not go far enough; it
should have moved to fully free markets. Others say there should have been
no deregulation, for markets for electricity cannot work. Both sides over-
simplify. The deregulation fell short in retaining retail price controls and
preventing prices from signaling scarcity; it went too far in eliminating re-
straints on overpricing by the generating companies. The problem was not
too much or too little use of markets, but poor market design.
In its spectrum auctions the U.S. government adopted a novel form of
auction, the simultaneous ascending auction, designed to address the spe-
ciﬁc features of the spectrum market. (For details of the market design, see
McAfee and McMillan 1996 and Milgrom 2000.) The success of the spec-
trum auctions justiﬁed the choice of auction form.
With the tradable pollution licenses, by contrast, the market-design is-
sue was not fully faced. The government put in place an auction for the al-
lowances that was ﬂawed—in a way that shows the importance of appar-
ently innocuous features of the rules of the market game. (Cason and Plott
1996 pointed out this ﬂaw in the EPA auction.) The market process was a
double auction: potential sellers submitted price-quantity oﬀers, and po-
tential buyers submitted price-quantity bids. The rules for setting the
prices unintentionally had the eﬀect of giving not only buyers but also sell-
ers incentives to bid low.
The poor auction design could have been a dampener on emissions trad-
ing. By luck, however, it turned out to have no ill eﬀects. Bottom-up mar-
ket creation compensated for ﬂaws in the top-down market design. The
emissions-allowances program was rescued by the emergence of a private
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as a way of jump-starting the private market, and in this it succeeded.) In-
termediaries took on the role of market makers, buying and selling al-
lowances on behalf of clients and sometimes speculating on their own ac-
count. Although sellers may be deterred by the prospect of low prices from
oﬀering their allowances in the EPA auction, they have the alternative of
the private market. The private market handles most of the transactions.
The secondary market in emissions allowances is easy to operate. One
allowance is identical to another: it is simply the right to emit one ton of
sulfur dioxide in a year. Because of the simplicity of what is being traded,
it was not diﬃcult to create a smoothly operating secondary market in
emissions allowances. For this reason, in the case of emissions allowances,
getting the market design wrong turned out to be inconsequential. With
the emissions allowances, it was just a matter of leaving it to the market.
We cannot usually rely on secondary markets, however, to rescue a badly
designed primary market. In the case of the spectrum auctions, a sponta-
neously developed secondary market could not be expected to operate eﬃ-
ciently (at least without a lengthy period of evolution). The very reasons
why designing the spectrum auctions was nontrivial—the complementar-
ities among the licenses—meant the secondary market would be plagued
by high transaction costs and resulting ineﬃciencies. Because the second-
ary market could not be relied on, it was important to get the initial auc-
tion design right.
Emissions allowances are an exception that proves the rule. Generally,
the design of a market must be watertight, especially when large sums of
money are at stake. Any oversight in market design can have harmful
repercussions, as bidders can be counted on to seek ways to outfox the
mechanism. A newly instituted market achieves what it is supposed to only
if it is well designed. The rules of the market matter.10
3.5.3 Markets Do Not Supersede Regulation
Emissions allowances do not take the government out of pollution con-
trol, but help it control pollution more eﬃciently. The government hands
over to the market a part of its role: deciding how the emissions cutbacks
are to be shared among the ﬁrms. But it retains its primary roles: assessing
how much pollution in total is to be allowed, checking compliance, and ﬁn-
ing any ﬁrms that break the rules.
In deregulated electricity markets also, government oversight continues
to be needed. The transmission grid—the web of high-voltage lines that
carry the power—is by its nature a monopoly, and so cannot be left to an
unregulated market. Because of the physics of electricity, the operator of
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10. For more on how the rules of market matter to its eﬃcient operation, see McMillan
(2002).the grid must constantly monitor it to ensure its reliability. The amount of
power being pumped into the grid by the generators must always equal the
amount being tapped by electricity users. The transmission system would
be destabilized, bringing blackouts around the state, if there were a sudden
uncompensated surge in the amount of electricity either being put in or
drawn out. No matter how smoothly the retail and wholesale electricity
markets operate, therefore, the grid needs continuing regulation.
Electricity-market regulation is needed also for competition-policy rea-
sons. Because demand is insensitive to price and the consequences of a
supply shortfall are severe, a few producers are, in periods if peak demand,
in the position of being able to bid prices far above production costs. These
high prices do not immediately call forth new sources of supply, since new-
generation facilities take years to come online. Unlike the case of the pol-
lution allowances, private-sector intermediaries cannot step in to correct
the oﬃcial market’s failings by starting their own marketplaces, for all the
power must travel through the grid. Competition by itself cannot always be
relied on to hold the price down close to generation costs. There continues
to be a role for regulatory oversight of pricing.
With spectrum auctions, similarly, a role for the government remains. It
continues to coordinate the usage of the spectrum by deﬁning the purposes
each wavelength band can be put to—broadcasting or various speciﬁc
telecommunications applications. Some of this coordination role can in
principle be passed on to the market: New Zealand is going the farthest in
considering passing some of the spectrum management to the private sec-
tor. But the government still does the waveband equivalent of land-use
zoning. The ultimate decision on how the publicly owned spectrum is to be
used remains with the government. This is because there are externalities:
users of adjacent wavebands might cause interference with each other. And
reassigning spectrum as new technologies arise might require some central
coordination.
With ﬁsheries, also, creating and enforcing workable property rights re-
quires ongoing government action. Quotas do not eliminate the need for
regulatory supervision. The regulator must decide what level of total catch
is sustainable. It must devise rules on who initially receives the quotas. Di-
viding up the rights to the catch is a source of contention among the ﬁshers.
No system of monitoring, moreover, is infallible. New Zealand goes to
great lengths to prevent out-of-quota ﬁshing. It insists on full documenta-
tion, with paperwork recording each step of the ﬁshes’ journey from point of
landing to ﬁnal consumption or export. Fishers may not sell ﬁsh to anyone
other than a licensed ﬁsh receiver. Catch reports, licensed-ﬁsh-receiver re-
ceipts, cold-storage records, and export invoices are all collated and checked
for discrepancies. Overﬁshing and misreporting are criminal oﬀenses.11
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11. On monitoring, see Batkin (1996) and Squires, Kirkley, and Tisdell (1995).Property rights are not a free lunch. Transaction costs must be faced, as
Coase (1960) stressed. Quota oversight is expensive. With a ﬁshery, as with
the other public-sector applications, resorting to markets does not remove
the need for government action.
3.6 Competition as a Tool of Redistribution
In 1961 President John F. Kennedy issued an executive order requiring
government contractors to “take aﬃrmative action to ensure that appli-
cants are employed and employees are treated during employment without
regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin.” Since then, aﬃrma-
tive action policies have waxed and waned. Of necessity, given the nature
of the task, they have mostly taken the form of administered policies, in-
cluding court-mandated correction of inequities in employment and uni-
versity-admission rules favoring minority applicants. But market-based
policies have also been used, particularly in government contracting and
procurement.
Blacks and Hispanics have historically been underrepresented among
owners of U.S. businesses. In part this was because of discrimination in the
credit market. Studies of loan patterns have found that, controlling for fac-
tors like credit ratings and previous bankruptcies, blacks are less likely to
receive bank credit than other entrepreneurs. Even in the absence of dis-
crimination, underrepresentation can be self-perpetuating. In industries
like construction, when an upcoming job is announced, some preselected
ﬁrms are invited to bid for it, based on their having done good work in the
past. For minority-owned ﬁrms this was a catch-22. They could not bid for
a contract, because they were not put on the list of invitees, because they
had not had a contract.
Aﬃrmative action in government contracting was intended to increase
the disproportionately small share of government contracts going to mi-
nority-owned ﬁrms. It has been a success, as measured by a markedly in-
creased share of contracts held by minority ﬁrms and an increase in black
employment. The evidence on the program’s costs is sketchy, but what there
is suggests that they have been low (despite some fraud, with phony mi-
nority-owned ﬁrms being created as a front for white-owned ﬁrms in order
to receive the preferences). The price paid relative to the government’s
prior cost estimate has been on average little diﬀerent for minority ﬁrms
beneﬁting from preferences than for others. In New Jersey, the introduc-
tion of preferences sharply increased the share of contracts going to mi-
nority ﬁrms, but their cessation a few years later brought no reduction in
the share, suggesting that the minority ﬁrms had been given a jump start
by the program and then had been able to stand on their own.12
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12. The foregoing draws on Holzer and Neumark (2000).The U.S. government, as well as state and local governments, used two
kinds of aﬃrmative-action policies in contracting. One was to guarantee
that certain contracts went to minority-owned ﬁrms. A contract was
oﬀered to a single minority ﬁrm without competitive bidding, or the con-
tract was put up for bidding on a set-aside basis, meaning that only minor-
ity-owned ﬁrms could bid for it. An alternative policy, that of price prefer-
ences, consisted of designing the market’s rules so as to achieve the policy
goal. Contracts were put up for bid in the normal way, but with the diﬀer-
ence that minority-owned ﬁrms received a price break. Before the govern-
ment compared the bids, it subtracted a speciﬁed amount from the minor-
ity-owned ﬁrms’ bids, usually 10 percent, meaning a minority ﬁrm could
win if its bid was higher, by no more than 10 percent, than a nonminority
ﬁrm’s bid.
Mayor David N. Dinkins introduced a 10 percent price preference for
ﬁrms owned by minorities or women into New York City’s municipal con-
tracting in 1993. One year later, according to a report issued by the Dink-
ins administration, minority- and women-owned companies’ share of the
contracts had risen sharply, from 9.0 percent to 17.5 percent. The cost of
the program through not selecting the lowest bids, the report said, was $2.7
million, or 1 percent of the total contracting budget. The city of Los An-
geles implemented a similar price-preference program.
Government preferences were controversial. The New York program
was abolished by Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, not only on the grounds of
cost but also from a philosophical objection to aﬃrmative action. Califor-
nia voters voted in a 1996 ballot initiative to end aﬃrmative action pro-
grams. Los Angeles then replaced its aﬃrmative action program with a 5
percent price preference for any small ﬁrm. Since many of the small busi-
nesses are owned by minorities and women, however, the small-business
price break meant that the Los Angeles contracts were still steered toward
them (the share of city spending going to minority ﬁrms rose from 12 per-
cent in 1996 to 15 percent in 2000; New York Times,2 February 1994, p. B2;
San Jose Mercury News,4 December 2000, p. 1A).
Setting aside a contract for one or a few bidders necessarily increases the
price paid by the government, since, with bidding competition eliminated
or reduced, there is no reliable way of identifying which ﬁrm would have
the lowest cost of doing the job. A price preference, by contrast, can be a
free-lunch policy. It not only addresses the public-policy goal of increasing
the number of contracts going to the minority ﬁrms, but it also could ac-
tually sometimes lower the average price the government pays its contrac-
tors.13 With price preferences, a minority ﬁrm would win if its bid was no
more than 10 percent higher than the lowest bid from a nonminority ﬁrm.
The minority ﬁrms typically have a higher cost of carrying out the con-
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13. This piece of theorizing is from McAfee and McMillan (1987, 714–16).tracted work than the nonminority ﬁrms (because of lack of access to cap-
ital and lack of experience). They would therefore impose little competitive
pressure on the nonminority ﬁrms, which could, if there were little compe-
tition among themselves, get away with bidding relatively high. A price
preference for the minority ﬁrms stimulates the bidding competition, forc-
ing the nonminority ﬁrms to bid lower. Depending on the level of the price
preference, its price-lowering eﬀect (from the lower bids from the nonmi-
nority ﬁrms) could sometimes outweigh its price-raising eﬀect (from the
chance that a minority ﬁrm wins and must be paid a relatively high price).
The price preferences, therefore, should not much increase the govern-
ment’s overall contracting bill; they are more cost eﬀective than the alter-
native of earmarking some contracts for minority ﬁrms. Price preferences
can help level an unlevel playing ﬁeld.
This logic came to play in the designing of the spectrum auctions. Con-
gress required the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to “ensure
that small businesses, rural telephone companies, and businesses owned by
members of minority groups and women are given the opportunity to par-
ticipate in the provision of spectrum-based services” (U.S. Congress 1993).
The ﬁrst two FCC auctions included price preferences, of as much as 40 per-
cent. FCC chairman Reed E. Hundt described the preferences as oﬀering
“the single most important economic opportunity made available to women
and minorities in our country’s history” (McAfee and McMillan 1996, p.
167). They were controversial, however. “We want a guarantee of spectrum
competition,” wrote William Saﬁre in the New York Times. “The criterion
to determine competition must be scrupulously economic, not jiggered by
the Government to introduce sexual or racial or ethnic or ideological fa-
voritism” (New York Times, 16 March 1995). Despite revealing a misun-
derstanding of the eﬀects of price preferences—as just argued, they could
actually make the bidding more competitive—such views became domi-
nant. When the mood in Washington turned against aﬃrmative action, the
FCC scrapped the preferences from subsequent auctions. Nevertheless,
where they were used they succeeded in their policy aim of helping some
minority-owned ﬁrms enter the mobile telecommunications industry.
Market mechanisms, then, can in some circumstances be called upon to
help with redistribution toward the disadvantaged—and can achieve it
more cost eﬀectively than administrative methods.
3.7 Conclusion
In picking winners, governments have a poor track record. Picking win-
ners is exactly what the government is called upon to do when it makes al-
location decisions such as which ﬁrm gets the right to use a publicly owned
resource. A market-based allocation leaves the government to do what
only it can do, while turning over to the market the job of picking winners.
Using Markets to Help Solve Public Problems 87Competitive markets, if well designed, can reveal the information that is
needed for allocating the resources eﬃciently. Markets do not replace the
government’s regulatory role, but in the right circumstances they can be an
eﬀective instrument of regulation.
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Comment Kyoji Fukao
As I am not an expert on industrial organization, my comments will be of
a general nature.
This paper reviews four examples of public-sector uses of markets and
derives several important lessons; for example, markets reveal information
and markets must be well designed. I found the paper quite informative, be-
cause the author provides very clear explanations of complicated issues
such as electromagnetic-spectrum auctions and the retail market for elec-
tricity. Moreover, I basically agree with the author’s argument on the les-
sons to be learned. I have four comments.
My ﬁrst comment is on theory. The author argues that the desirability of
the introduction of a market and optimal market design depend crucially
on the characteristics of the goods that will be traded. However, these is-
sues are not addressed systematically. If the author provided us with a gen-
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Kyoji Fukao is professor at the Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.eral theory on the use of the market, this would be very helpful. Let me give
an example. Important characteristics of goods can be classiﬁed into sev-
eral factors. First, diﬃculties in establishing and protecting property rights
are an important factor. In the case of ﬁsheries and pollution, monitoring
the property rights is expensive. Second, diﬃculties in storage and elastic-
ity of intertemporal substitution are another important factor. If it is diﬃ-
cult to store goods, as in the case of electricity, we will have quite volatile
spot prices and the introduction of forward markets will be an important
issue. Third, the risk of market power abuses is another important factor.
If the author drew a ﬁgure, or table, in which each axis denotes one of these
characteristics, and located each good in this ﬁgure, the theoretical anal-
ysis of the paper would become clearer.
My second comment is on the relationship between the use of markets
and privatization. The author does not show us explicitly how his argu-
ment is related to the privatization issue. If the author elaborated on this
issue, the reader would be able to better understand the close relationship
between this and other papers presented at this seminar. Let me give an
example. In the case of industries in which networks for transmission and
distribution are important, such as electricity, telecommunications, and
railroads, it is sometimes desirable to continue regulating the “wires” busi-
ness, and to privatize the industry through vertical separation. In such
cases, the design of the wholesale market is a very important issue.
My third comment regards data on market prices. If some data on mar-
ket prices were provided in the paper, the author’s argument would become
more persuasive. For example, I would like to see some ﬁgures for the
wholesale price of electricity. International or interregional comparisons
of price levels also would be informative. If the author could compare the
average price level for the electromagnetic spectrum among countries and
analyze what market characteristics aﬀect the price level, this would en-
hance the study.
My last comment regards international aspects. I think that whether for-
eigners are permitted to participate in a new market or not, and whether
goods are internationally tradable or not, are pertinent topics. I would like
to ask the author to consider these issues in his future work.
Comment Tsuruhiko Nambu
This paper is quite insightful; it gives us an opportunity to rethink the tide
of deregulation or join a chorus for market mechanisms. As far as there ex-
ist public policy goals, a third party must remain to solve this task. With-
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Tsuruhiko Nambu is professor of economics at Gakushuin University.out this entity, one variable is missing for solving the overall social system.
This is common sense, but its meaning is clearly veriﬁed by considering
four episodes: pollution control, electricity, spectrum allocation, and ﬁsh-
ery management. In three cases of the four, market mechanisms worked to
a remarkable extent to help government realize public goals. But in one
case, electricity, we witnessed a total failure in California.
In the ﬁrst three cases, the task of government is to assign property
rights: to give proper incentives to realize public objectives. In the last case,
government intervened in the old market paradigm, namely vertical inte-
gration, to create an unbundled system. I think the cases of pollution and
ﬁsheries are readily understandable because they are based upon approv-
ing vested interests without asking for distributional fairness at the start. If
the eventual result is acceptable from the viewpoint of public policy, then
the initial distribution of rights does not matter: this is a pragmatic ap-
proach.
Less convincing is the case of spectrum auctions. It is true that auctions
reveal the value of spectra, but I wonder whether they oﬀer an eﬃcient so-
lution. Let us look at the U.S. telecommunications industry, where entry
into local markets used to be forbidden by the consent decree. Long-
distance carriers wished to enter the local market. They employed a strat-
egy to make use of cellular telephony to beat regional Bell operating com-
panies (RBOCs). Because of the constraints on long-distance carriers,
their willingness to pay for an electromagnetic spectrum might be greater
than without constraints. It may have pushed up prices more than neces-
sary. The move of RBOCs to defend their markets may have accelerated
this price increase. Summing up, I wish to say that institutional bias sur-
rounding the telecommunications industry would harm the auction re-
sults. Looking at the reality that AT&T is said to divest its cellular division
may help us understand the situation.
I fully agree with the discussion on electricity failure in California. One
comment may be in order when we remember the bad relationship between
the Public Utility Commission and electricity companies in California. In
transition from the old system to new, some constructive talks were neces-
sary, especially when knowledge was owned one-sidedly by the incumbent
ﬁrms. If regulated ﬁrms do not have any incentive to collaborate with regu-
lators who impose transition costs on them, they will not teach their secrets,
later possibly inducing a breakdown of the system. In my guess, this was the
case of mustrun electric power–generating plants sold oﬀ by the electric
power utilities. Many experts say that these should not have been allowed to
be sold oﬀso as to maintain voltage control. But California utilities, it seems,
did not pay attention to this problem. There may have been discussion over
these matters if there had existed smoother communication between regu-
lated ﬁrms and the regulator. This kind of relationship is dependent on his-
tory, and I think we need to be sensible of this path dependence.
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